The Missiles of October
prev.
play.
mark.
next.

:31:01
while simultaneously warning Khrushchev
:31:03
that a Soviet counteraction means war.
:31:07
Maybe is better to go down
with a bang then a whimper.

:31:11
Beating a blockade is far from perfect,
:31:13
but is surely preferable to that.
:31:14
A blockade is every bit as much an act
of war as an air strike.

:31:17
I don't agree, sir.
:31:19
There's a precedent to a blockade,
:31:20
which at least will give us
the semblance of a legal framework.

:31:23
Legal niceties now are
so much pompous foolishness.

:31:26
I am referring to Roosevels quarantine
:31:27
on Nazi Germany before we entered
World War II.

:31:29
Shortly before.
:31:30
The defensive quarantine.
:31:32
The United Nations charter
recognizes a right

:31:34
of hemispheric self-defense.
:31:36
If we can get the
Organization of American States

:31:37
to endorse a blockade,
:31:39
at least we'd have a strong legal case
to take to the United Nations.

:31:42
The Russians respect legality, sir.
:31:45
They may twist and turn them
to their own advantage,

:31:47
but they're always impressed
by a good, solid dialectic.

:31:50
It is our inherent right
to protect ourselves.

:31:53
Nobody contests that, sir.
:31:54
And therefore,
a legal pretext is superfluous.

:31:57
Gentlemen, an attack on Cuba
will not necessarily

:31:59
bring the Soviet Union into war with us.
:32:02
On the other hand, a blockade,
excuse me, a quarantine,

:32:05
will not neutralize the weapons
already in Cuba,

:32:09
will not force Khrushchev
to remove such weapons,

:32:12
and will not eliminate the risk of war.
:32:14
When we stop and search ships,
we will be engaged with Russians,

:32:18
not with Cubans.
:32:20
And obviously, when we quarantine Cuba,
:32:22
the Russians will have an open excuse
to blockade Berlin.

:32:26
Your arguments, as always,
are very persuasive.

:32:30
And yet, I wouldn't want to be
the American Tojo

:32:33
with a Pearl Harbor on my conscience.
:32:36
Yes.
:32:37
I've heard that analogy before.
:32:39
I know that you have.
:32:42
I think, Mr. President,
that you've made your decision.

:32:47
Whatever is going to be
we'll have to inform our allies.

:32:51
DeGaulle could be a problem.
:32:54
Perhaps you should send
the Vice President to Paris.

:32:57
Perhaps.

prev.
next.