The Missiles of October
prev.
play.
mark.
next.

:22:00
when a fore-rocket malfunctioned.
:22:03
All right now, gentlemen, can we,
very clearly and economically

:22:06
run down the diplomatic possibilities
as you've analyzed them,

:22:08
one, two, three, and so on.
:22:10
The first possibility, Bobby,
is to confront Gromyko

:22:12
with our evidence and our demands.
:22:13
And whas his probable response?
:22:15
I view of past performance,
no doubt, he'd deny everything

:22:17
and we'd have tipped our hand
without improving out situation.

:22:19
Yes, I agree, thas unacceptable.
:22:21
Now the second possibility
is send an emissary

:22:23
directly to Khrushchev
with a message from the President

:22:25
demanding that he remove
the missiles at once.

:22:28
Now, as to that, Bobby,
Khrushchev's obvious ploy

:22:30
would be to admit to the President
what the President already knows,

:22:33
and then to call for a conference
or a summit to resolve the crisis.

:22:37
See, that way, he'd be talking
:22:38
while the bases became operational.
:22:40
Yes, which is precisely
what we're doing now.

:22:42
Anything else?
:22:43
Yes, now, the third track
we considered, Bobby,

:22:45
involves sending an emissary
directly to Castro

:22:47
and putting out the danger to Cuba
of a nuclear confrontation there.

:22:50
The objection is that the bases
are under direct Russian control.

:22:52
Even if we could influence Castro,
:22:54
there's no reason to assume that
he could divert Russian policy.

:22:57
In a way, the missiles
hold Castro hostage.

:23:00
Is there a fourth possibility?
:23:03
Yes, sir, there is.
:23:05
A fourth possibility would be
to by-pass the Russians completely,

:23:09
and to take the entire issue
to the UN at a strategic moment

:23:13
of our own choosing.
:23:14
The difficulty, Ambassador,
as you well know,

:23:16
is that the Soviet Union can veto us
in the Security Council.

:23:20
And to make matters worse,
Zorin's chairman there this month.

:23:23
I see.
:23:25
So, it doesn't appear that any
of the diplomatic channels

:23:28
will do the job.
:23:29
Well, we'll have to use diplomatic
channels to explain and to justify

:23:32
our actions to the rest of the world.
:23:35
And, ultimately,
we'll have to find an accommodation

:23:37
with the Soviets.
:23:38
But diplomacy in and of itself
will not remove the missiles.

:23:42
It appears that we've boiled down
to two options, and only two.

:23:48
We bomb them or we blockade.
:23:51
Whas the consensus?
:23:53
There isn't one yet,
but I think if we took a vote today,

:23:55
we'd be bombing tomorrow.
:23:57
What about you?
:23:58
How, from the love of God,
can President Kennedy


prev.
next.