:21:02
Dallas, Panama Canal,
and all of Central America.
:21:08
The intermediate-range missile capability
reaches nearly
:21:11
all of the United States,
southeastern Canada,
:21:15
and all of Mexico, Central America,
Panama Canal,
:21:21
and much of South America.
:21:23
Do we have any, hard
photographic evidence
:21:27
that the nuclear warheads
for these missiles
:21:29
are actually in Cuba?
:21:31
No, sir.
:21:32
Why not?
:21:33
They are comparatively small and easy
:21:35
to conceal, Mr. President,
:21:36
but you can rest assured
that they're there somewhere.
:21:38
How can I be certain?
:21:40
Those Soviet ICBM's are only compatible
with nuclear warheads.
:21:43
The Soviet Union this morning
successfully fired
:21:46
two multi-stage missiles 7500 miles
to bulls-eye landings
:21:49
in the central Pacific.
:21:53
An American high-altitude nuclear test
in the Pacific
:21:57
failed today for the fourth time
in five tries,
:22:00
when a fore-rocket malfunctioned.
:22:03
All right now, gentlemen, can we,
very clearly and economically
:22:06
run down the diplomatic possibilities
as you've analyzed them,
:22:08
one, two, three, and so on.
:22:10
The first possibility, Bobby,
is to confront Gromyko
:22:12
with our evidence and our demands.
:22:13
And whas his probable response?
:22:15
I view of past performance,
no doubt, he'd deny everything
:22:17
and we'd have tipped our hand
without improving out situation.
:22:19
Yes, I agree, thas unacceptable.
:22:21
Now the second possibility
is send an emissary
:22:23
directly to Khrushchev
with a message from the President
:22:25
demanding that he remove
the missiles at once.
:22:28
Now, as to that, Bobby,
Khrushchev's obvious ploy
:22:30
would be to admit to the President
what the President already knows,
:22:33
and then to call for a conference
or a summit to resolve the crisis.
:22:37
See, that way, he'd be talking
:22:38
while the bases became operational.
:22:40
Yes, which is precisely
what we're doing now.
:22:42
Anything else?
:22:43
Yes, now, the third track
we considered, Bobby,
:22:45
involves sending an emissary
directly to Castro
:22:47
and putting out the danger to Cuba
of a nuclear confrontation there.
:22:50
The objection is that the bases
are under direct Russian control.
:22:52
Even if we could influence Castro,
:22:54
there's no reason to assume that
he could divert Russian policy.
:22:57
In a way, the missiles
hold Castro hostage.