The Missiles of October
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:48:00
my government will not ship
any more weapons to Cuba,

:48:03
and those that are there will
either be withdrawn or destroyed.

:48:08
You will reciprocate by withdrawing
your blockade

:48:16
and agreeing not to invade Cuba.
:48:20
Mr. President, if you have not lost
your self control

:48:28
and understand what this might lead to,
:48:31
then we ought not to pull
on the ends of the rope

:48:32
in which you have tied the knot of war.
:48:35
Because the more we pull,
the tighter the knot will become.

:48:43
And the moment may come
when the knot is tied so tightly

:48:46
that even we may not have the strength
to untie it.

:48:50
We will have to cut it,
and thereby to doom the world

:48:54
to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war.
:49:02
Let us not only relax the forces
pulling on the ends of the rope,

:49:13
let us take measures to untie the knot.
:49:26
Is Khrushchev, all right,
I can see him,

:49:29
isolated in the Kremlin,
trying to compose himself.

:49:32
Is the sound of his voice.
:49:34
What did Acheson say?
:49:36
Well, he agrees that the letter
is from Khrushchev,

:49:38
but he doubts that the Kremlin
will go through with the deal.

:49:41
Perhaps thas why the letter
is so disjointed.

:49:45
Perhaps he sent it entirely
on his own initiative.

:49:47
Yes, but where in this torrent of words
:49:50
does Khrushchev specifically mention
:49:52
removing those missiles
under UN supervision?

:49:55
Well, that proposal is essentially
:49:56
what Foreman outlined to Skally.
:49:58
Now, sir, I think is possible
that the two initiatives


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