:49:02
Let us not only relax the forces
pulling on the ends of the rope,
:49:13
let us take measures to untie the knot.
:49:26
Is Khrushchev, all right,
I can see him,
:49:29
isolated in the Kremlin,
trying to compose himself.
:49:32
Is the sound of his voice.
:49:34
What did Acheson say?
:49:36
Well, he agrees that the letter
is from Khrushchev,
:49:38
but he doubts that the Kremlin
will go through with the deal.
:49:41
Perhaps thas why the letter
is so disjointed.
:49:45
Perhaps he sent it entirely
on his own initiative.
:49:47
Yes, but where in this torrent of words
:49:50
does Khrushchev specifically mention
:49:52
removing those missiles
under UN supervision?
:49:55
Well, that proposal is essentially
:49:56
what Foreman outlined to Skally.
:49:58
Now, sir, I think is possible
that the two initiatives
:50:00
could be considered jointly.
:50:01
The hopeful fact Mr. President,
:50:02
is that Khrushchev isn't demanding
:50:04
that we give up our bases
in Italy, Turkey, or Guantanamo.
:50:06
Mr. President,
I think you should draft a response
:50:08
to this as quickly as possible.
:50:10
Before we do that,
I want to make absolutely certain
:50:11
there are no booby traps here.
:50:15
You'll have to burn the midnight oil
again tonight.
:50:21
I want this letter analyzed,
:50:23
and in light of the Foreman initiative,
:50:28
and a response drafted
that we can go over in the morning.
:50:30
In the morning?
:50:31
Yes, in the morning.
:50:33
Cheer up, gentlemen,
:50:37
your President is going to get
a good nighs sleep.
:50:42
Yes?
:50:43
I'm sorry,
there is no reply from Kennedy.
:50:49
If he had responded immediately,
:50:52
perhaps we could have
blocked the momentum.
:50:54
Now...
:50:58
there was a man in a field